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THE MAVERICK THEORY: 
CREATING TURBULENCE FOR MERGERS 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has described federal antitrust law as “the Magna 
Carta of free enterprise” and “as important to the preservation of economic 
freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection 
of our fundamental personal freedoms.”1 The Court noted that “the freedom 
guaranteed [to] each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom 
to compete—to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity 
whatever economic muscle it can muster.”2 Often, a firm that takes advantage 
of this freedom to compete is a maverick firm.3 A maverick firm is a firm that 
deviates from its rivals and disrupts the market, benefitting customers.4 By 
sparing a maverick firm from elimination, the government can fulfill its role in 
antitrust enforcement by blocking anticompetitive mergers and maintaining 
competitive markets.5 
However, the Department of Justice’s recent use of the federal antitrust 
laws effectively alienated American Airlines and US Airways, leaving these 
airlines feeling singled out, like the ugly ducklings of the airline industry.6 The 
Department of Justice (DOJ) allowed American Airlines to purchase TWA in 
2001.7 American West Airlines freely combined with US Airways in 2005.8 
 
 1. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); see also Daniel E. 
Lazaroff, Antitrust Symposium—Introduction: So What Else Is New?, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1023, 
1023–24 (2012). 
 2. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. at 610. 
 3. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 2.1 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-20 
10.pdf. 
 4. Id. 
 5. J. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust for 
Airlines, Remarks Before the Regional Airline Association President’s Council Meeting 2 (Nov. 
3, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/217987.pdf). 
 6. See David Koenig, Proposed US Airways, American Airlines Merger Challenged by 
Justice Department, States, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 13, 2013, 8:17 PM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2013/08/13/us-airways-american-airlines-merger_n_3748865.html. 
 7. Kevin Diaz, NWA-Delta Merger Seen Likely to Pass U.S. Scrutiny, STAR TRIB. (Jan. 20, 
2008, 9:17 AM), http://www.startribune.com/business/13905096.html. 
 8. Id. 
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Nobody complained when Delta successfully merged with Northwest in 2008.9 
And where was the DOJ when United merged with Continental in 2010?10 In 
fact, the DOJ had not levied opposition to an airline merger since 2001.11 With 
so many successful combinations, American Airlines and US Airways had 
expected to cruise toward the completion of a merger that would create the 
world’s biggest airline.12 With their confidence high, American Airlines and 
US Airways had even named executives for the newly merged company.13 
Unfortunately, the parties were left stunned when the federal government 
along with six states challenged the merger, alleging that the merger would 
“hurt competition and cost consumers hundreds of millions of dollars a year in 
higher fares and extra fees.”14 Even airline analysts were “stunned” by the 
government’s decision to oppose the merger, causing many to predict that the 
deal would eventually succeed.15 Unmoved, American Airlines and US 
Airways levied staunch opposition to the suit, even petitioning for an order 
requiring the DOJ to turn over documents about the previous successful airline 
mergers.16 Along with the companies, labor groups also argued that the DOJ 
should drop the suit17 because it had not interfered in other recent airline 
combinations.18 
 
 9. Elaine Glusac, The Blocked-For-Now Airline Merger: What Travelers Can Expect, 
ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/228201. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Koenig, supra note 6. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Marilyn Geewax, DOJ Suit Seen Delaying, Not Killing Big Airline Merger, NPR (Aug. 
13, 2013, 5:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/08/13/211729307/doj-suit-seen-delaying-not-kill 
ing-big-airline-merger (“‘Given that other airline mergers were approved, this was a surprise,’ 
University of Richmond transportation economist George Hoffer said. Other carriers already have 
been allowed to combine forces, so ‘it’s illogical to oppose this merger. This move comes a day 
late and a dollar short.’”). 
 16. David McLaughlin, Airline Merger Records ‘Irrelevant’ in AMR Case, U.S. Says, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-09-26/airline-
merger-records-irrelevant-in-amr-case-u-dot-s-dot-says-1. The DOJ opposed this request for 
documents, arguing the information was protected from disclosure and that the decision to not 
challenge previous airline mergers was irrelevant to the present case over the current merger. Id. 
The DOJ stated, “Every merger must be evaluated on its own terms in light of current industry 
conditions.” Id. 
 17. Keith Laing, Labor Groups to DOJ: Back Off US Air-American Merger, THE HILL (Aug. 
20, 2013, 7:18 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/transportation-report/aviation/317907-labor-groups-
to-justice-dept-back-off-airline-merger. 
 18. Id. As TDD President Ed Wytkind noted, “The DOJ’s inaction when Northwest and 
Delta merged or when United and Continental combined is what led US Airways and American 
to seek a merger . . . . By combining forces, these airlines are just trying to remain viable 
competitors in a shrinking competitive landscape that the DOJ allowed to exist.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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Regardless of the uproar over the DOJ’s action, this suit was actually quite 
predictable, given the Obama administration’s promise to aggressively pursue 
merger enforcement, coupled with the 2010 changes to the Merger Guidelines 
and the particular structure of the American Airlines/US Airways merger.19 
Despite the past successful airline combinations and US Airways being a 
smaller airline, the DOJ identified many viable issues with this merger, such as 
the connecting route overlaps and the industry concentration with only a few 
major airlines in the market.20 However, one major principle that the 
government has relied upon in opposing the American Airlines/US Airways 
merger is the “maverick theory.”21 
This Comment will discuss the Obama administration’s fulfillment of a 
campaign promise to revive merger enforcement after the lax merger policies 
under the Bush administration and the utilization of the maverick theory to 
walk a fine doctrinal line in order to aggressively enforce antitrust laws. 
Specifically, this Comment will compare and contrast the use of the maverick 
theory under different administrations, focusing on the Obama administration’s 
use of the maverick theory to protect consumers’ interests in the recent 
American Airlines/US Airways merger challenge. Lastly, this Comment will 
argue that the maverick theory will be utilized unpredictably by future 
administrations, creating uncertainty in the field for businesses seeking to 
merge. 
I.  OBAMA ADMINISTRATION PROMISES TO REROUTE ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT 
In 2007, during his campaign, then-candidate President Obama declared 
that, if elected, he would “direct [his] administration to reinvigorate antitrust 
enforcement” and that, under his watch, the antitrust agencies would “step up 
review of merger activity and take effective action to stop or restructure those 
mergers that are likely to harm consumer welfare, while quickly clearing those 
that do not.”22 Thus, during President Obama’s first term, merger enforcement, 
 
 19. See infra Parts I, VI. 
 20. See Susan Carey et al., U.S. Moves to Block US Airways-American Airlines Merger, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2013, 7:57 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873 
24769704579010612415800106. 
 21. See id.; Donald L. Martin, Parsing the Case Against ‘New American Airlines,’ LAW 360 
(Oct. 2, 2013, 5:22 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/477222/parsing-the-case-against-new-
american-airlines. See also Mark J. Botti & Anthony W. Swisher, DOJ’s ABI/Modelo Challenge: 
Seeds of More Aggressive Merger Review & Enforcement, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal 
Found., Washington D.C.), May 3, 2013, at 1, 2–4 (discussing the Obama administration’s use of 
the maverick theory to oppose previous mergers). 
 22. Renata B. Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, IP, Antitrust and 
Looking Back on the Last Four Years, Remarks before the Global Competition Review 2nd 
Annual Antitrust Law Leaders Forum 2 (Feb. 8, 2013), in CORP. COUNS. Q., Apr. 2013. 
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as the DOJ’s antitrust activity is called,23 was predicted to be comparatively 
aggressive.24 In 2009, not long after President Obama took office, the 
downturn in the global economy affected merger and acquisition transactions, 
causing that year to be an extremely slow year in both global and domestic 
merger and acquisition activity.25 Despite a declining number of mergers and 
acquisitions in the marketplace overall, the DOJ under the Obama 
administration has steadily challenged anywhere from twelve to twenty merger 
transactions every fiscal year since Obama took office.26 Comparatively, the 
DOJ under President Obama’s predecessor, President George W. Bush, 
challenged forty-eight mergers in his first year but in another year declined to a 
low of challenging only four merger transactions.27 The DOJ and FTC 
 
 23. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, §1. 
 24. Botti & Swisher, supra note 21, at 1. 
 25.  Je ff r ey  McCracken  & Dana  C imi l luca ,  Global M&A May Have Hit Bottom, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487 
04876804574628450435655062 (“Global mergers-and-acquisition activity for 2009 was $2.3 
trillion, down 22% from $2.94 trillion in 2008 . . . . the lowest dollar value since $1.98 trillion in 
deals in 2004. The drop would have been slightly greater in 2009 were it not for extraordinary 
government interventions across the world . . . .”). 
 26. Botti & Swisher, supra note 21, at 1; FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 9–20 (2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/04/130430hsrreport.pdf (providing data on FTC and DOJ 
enforcement actions in 2012); FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-
RODINO ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 10–20 (2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/2012/06/2011hsrreport.pdf (providing data on FTC and DOJ enforcement actions in 2011); 
FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT 
FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 8–17 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/02/1101hsrre 
port.pdf (providing data on FTC and DOJ enforcement actions in 2010); FED. TRADE COMM’N & 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 7–15 
(2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/10/101001hsrreport.pdf (providing data on FTC 
and DOJ enforcement actions in 2009). 
 27. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL 
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 7–18 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports_annual/31st-report-fy-2008/hsrreport_0.pdf (providing data on FTC and DOJ 
enforcement actions in 2008); FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-
RODINO ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 10–21 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/2008/11/hsrreportfy2007.pdf (providing data on FTC and DOJ enforcement actions in 2007); 
FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT 
FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 10–19 (2007) available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/07/P110014hsrre 
port.pdf (providing data on FTC and DOJ enforcement actions in 2006); FED. TRADE COMM’N & 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 11–17 
(2006) available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hsr05/P989316twentyeighthannualhsrreport.pdf 
(providing data on FTC and DOJ enforcement actions in 2005); FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 8–17 (2005), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hsr05/050810hsrrpt.pdf (providing data on FTC and DOJ 
enforcement actions in 2004); FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-
RODINO ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 8–17 (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
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indiscriminately took on cases, both large and small, such as challenging 
Tyson’s $3 million plant sale, a relatively small transaction, to blocking 
AT&T’s attempted acquisition of T-Mobile.28 Additionally, opposition from 
the merging parties did not sway the agencies, as the DOJ successfully tried its 
first merger in nine years, preventing H&R Block from acquiring TaxACT.29 
Meanwhile, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) successfully blocked its first 
non-profit hospital merger in federal court and challenged another hospital 
combination in the U.S. Supreme Court,30 obtaining a decision limiting the 
ability of hospitals to claim immunity from federal antitrust laws.31 
However, taken at face value, these cases do not reflect any 
groundbreaking legal theories since they involve essentially conventional 
horizontal merger challenges.32 For example, AT&T/T-Mobile was a 
“conventional challenge to a ‘four to three’ merger (a merger between two 
firms in a market with four firms) between the second- and fourth-largest firms 
in a concentrated industry with high barriers to entry.”33 Similarly, other 
horizontal merger challenges, such as H&R Block/TaxACT, NASDAQ/NYSE, 
and Blue Cross/Blue Shield/Physicians Health, could have had the same result 
under any administration.34 
In 2010, the Obama administration implemented policy changes to the 
merger enforcement standards.35 Previously, the litigated cases seemed to lack 
any apparent doctrinal change, but the policies implemented in 2010, which are 
discussed in detail below, reflect “seeds for something more.”36 In the second 
 
os/2004/09/040903hsrrpt03.pdf (providing data on FTC and DOJ enforcement actions in 2003); 
FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT 
FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 8–18 (2003) available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/hsrannualre 
port.pdf (providing data on FTC and DOJ enforcement actions in 2002); FED. TRADE COMM’N & 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 14–28 
(2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/09/hsrarfy2001.pdf (providing data on FTC and 
DOJ enforcement actions in 2001); FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-
SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 8–31 (2001), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/annualreport2000.pdf (providing data on FTC and DOJ enforce 
ment actions in 2000). 
 28. Botti & Swisher, supra note 21, at 1. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Andrew Pollack, Supreme Court Gives F.T.C. a Win on Hospital Mergers, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/20/business/justices-back-ftc-on-blocking-hos 
pital-mergers.html?_r=0. 
 32. Botti & Swisher, supra note 21, at 1. 
 33. Daniel A. Crane, Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust 
Enforcement?, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 13, 16 (2012), available at http://www.stanfordlawre 
view.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/65_Stan._L._Rev._Online_13.pdf. 
 34. Id. at 16–17. 
 35. Botti & Swisher, supra note 21, at 1. 
 36. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
262 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:257 
term of the Obama administration, the seeds of new merger enforcement 
policies have blossomed, as indicated by cases such as the challenge to the 
Anheuser-Busch/InBev (ABI) acquisition of Grupo Modelo of Mexico 
(Modelo) and, most recently, the challenge to the American Airlines/US 
Airways merger.37 In the ABI/Modelo transaction, as in the American 
Airlines/US Airways merger, the DOJ walked a “fine doctrinal line” in 
concluding the challenge was warranted.38 Additionally, in both cases, the 
government thought the transaction was viable enough not to insist on 
abandonment of the transaction altogether because of its concerns.39 At the 
same time, the DOJ was willing to take the risk in pursuing the challenge.40 In 
September 2012, in reinforcing the DOJ’s staunch position, Acting Assistant 
Attorney General Joseph Wayland noted, “People have to understand that we 
are willing to litigate cases. People shouldn’t think that going up against DOJ 
trial lawyers is [a cakewalk].”41 As discussed further below in the context of 
the American Airlines/US Airways merger, the DOJ’s willingness to pursue 
merger enforcement, despite being required to walk a “fine doctrinal line” to 
do so, is evidence of the Obama administration’s aggressive stance on merger 
enforcement, which will likely impact the development of future merger 
enforcement policy.42 
II.  MAVERICK FIRM DEFINED 
One of the tools that the Obama administration has utilized in re-
energizing antitrust enforcement is the maverick theory.43 However, using the 
term “maverick” evokes two specific questions. First, who actually engages in 
antitrust enforcement in order to utilize the maverick theory? Second, what 
does the term maverick actually mean? 
The DOJ Antitrust Division and FTC are the agencies responsible for 
enforcing federal antitrust laws by reviewing mergers to determine if they may 
lessen competition.44 However, the agencies do not have a merger policy 
specific to any particular industry, including the airline industry.45 Instead, the 
 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. See also infra Part VI. 
 40. Botti & Swisher, supra note 21, at 1. 
 41. Peter Guryan & Richard Jamgochian, Antitrust Merger Activity: Notable Recent 
Developments and Takeaways for 2013, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Jan. 2013, at 1, 2. 
 42. See Botti & Swisher, supra note 21, at 1, 4 (discussing the Obama administration’s 
aggressive stance on merger enforcement in the context of the ABI/Modelo transaction). 
 43. See id. at 1, 2. 
 44. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, § 1; McDonald, supra 
note 5. 
 45. McDonald, supra note 5. 
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organizing principle is competition;46 so, like other merger analyses, the airline 
industry merger analysis is focused on the potential for lessening 
competition.47 The government’s role in antitrust law is to preserve 
competition within industries by seeking to challenge, and ultimately block, 
anticompetitive mergers in court.48 The DOJ and FTC release Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, which provide the agencies’ policies regarding mergers 
and acquisitions involving competitors under federal antitrust laws.49 The 
statutory provisions that the guidelines adhere to include: “Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1, 2, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
45.”50 In particular, Section 7 of the Clayton Act blocks mergers if “in any line 
of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the 
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”51 
With regards to what a maverick is, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
provide guidance. According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, a maverick 
firm is a firm having “a greater economic incentive to deviate from the terms 
of coordination than do most of [its] rivals.”52 In engaging in coordinated 
interaction to diminish competition, firms will reach terms of competition that 
are profitable to the firms involved and detect and punish deviations from 
those terms in order to avoid undermining the coordination.53 The incentive to 
deviate from the terms of coordination might be due to a number of different 
factors, such as being the proprietor of a new technology or business model, 
having the ability to expand production rapidly, or having a niche as a cost-
effective firm in the market.54 Moreover, being a maverick firm is not just a 
label on a company in a marketplace; rather, it is more of a functional place in 
the market.55 Both federal agencies in charge of antitrust enforcement—the 
DOJ and the FTC—apply the maverick label when referring to “firms that play 
a special competitive role in their industries and thus require protection under 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Martin, supra note 21. 
 48. McDonald, supra note 5. 
 49. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, § 1. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 52. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 
2.12 (1992), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf. 
 53. Id. § 2.1. 
 54. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, § 2.1.5. 
 55. See Taylor M. Owings, Note, Identifying a Maverick: When Antitrust Law Should 
Protect a Low-Cost Competitor, 66 VAND. L. REV. 323, 325 (2013). 
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antitrust law.”56 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines define the maverick 
as a firm that “plays a disruptive role in the market to the benefit of 
customers.”57 A maverick firm generally “constrains prices when industry 
coordination is incomplete.”58 Normally, a maverick would work to undermine 
the possibility that other firms will be able to “reach a mutually satisfactory 
outcome at a higher-than-competitive price.”59 Thus, having a maverick 
present in the marketplace may prevent or limit coordination among other 
firms in the marketplace.60 
The identification of a maverick that constrains more effective 
coordination may be instrumental in explaining which mergers are 
troublesome.61 First, the maverick theory could be utilized as a sword, 
exposing those mergers that would result in higher prices.62 Second, the 
maverick theory could be utilized as a shield, helping to identify when a 
combination will not effect the maverick’s business environment or inhibit 
competition but instead will increase efficiencies.63 Generally in analyzing 
mergers, as the number of firms decreases, the probability that the remaining 
firms will agree to operate at anticompetitive prices increases.64 Therefore, 
when a horizontal merger reduces the number of competitors in an industry 
from ten to nine, it usually causes less concern over anticompetitive behavior 
than a merger that reduces the number of firms from four to three.65 However, 
no hard and fast level of market concentration has been identified, common 
across industries, that triggers anti-competition concerns.66 Additionally, a 
smaller number of firms also make it more unlikely that one of the remaining 
firms will operate as a maverick.67 Thus, when the DOJ or the FTC has 
 
 56. Id. For example, the court in United States v. H&R Block, Inc., stated that the 
persuasiveness of the maverick theory depended upon identifying the specific firms whose 
independence is truly essential for healthy competition. 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 79–80 (D.D.C. 2011). 
Otherwise, calling a firm a maverick “amounts to little more than a game of semantic gotcha.” Id. 
at 79. 
 57. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, § 2.1.5. 
 58. Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated 
Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 135 (2002). 
 59. Id. at 152. 
 60. Paul T. Denis, The Give and Take of the Commentary on the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, ANTITRUST, Summer 2006, at 51, 53. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Baker, supra note 58, at 189. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 152. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 154. Additionally, there are other factors that are considered—market 
concentration is not the only factor relevant to the assessment of whether a merger will cause 
anticompetitive behavior. Id. 
 67. Baker, supra note 58, at 152. 
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identified a potential maverick firm in a highly concentrated industry and a 
merger will eliminate this maverick firm, problems arise due to the 
concentration of the market as well as the removal of the maverick’s influence 
from the marketplace.68 
Since the 2010 revision to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the 
elimination of a maverick firm exhibits direct evidence of an anticompetitive 
merger.69 This is a change from previous versions of the guidelines that had 
utilized a maverick status only in a totality-of-the-circumstances approach.70 
The 2010 guidelines provide that in addressing the question of “whether a 
merger may substantially lessen competition,” the agencies may consider any 
“reasonably available and reliable evidence.”71 The guidelines provide a list of 
categories and sources of evidence that has been predictive of the competitive 
effects of mergers in the past, including the following: 1) actual effects 
observed in consummated mergers, 2) direct comparisons based on experience, 
3) market shares and concentration in a relevant market, 4) substantial head-to-
head competition, and 5) disruptive role of a merging party (i.e. a maverick 
firm).72 To identify a maverick firm, the 2010 guidelines offer four examples 
of maverick behavior: if a firm 1) “threatens to disrupt market conditions with 
a new technology or business model,” 2) has an “incentive to take the lead in 
price cutting,” 3) has “the ability and incentive to expand production rapidly 
using available capacity,” or 4) “has often resisted otherwise prevailing 
industry norms to cooperate on price setting or other terms of competition,” 
then it may be a maverick firm.73 In essence, a merger analysis focused on the 
role of a maverick would ask whether the transaction affects the maverick’s 
incentives or ability to constrain system-wide price increases.74 Since it is now 
clear what the maverick theory is, it is important to discuss the role of the 
maverick theory in antitrust enforcement. 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Owings, supra note 55, at 328. 
 70. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 52; see Owings, supra note 
55, at 328 (“Prior versions discussed the maverick status of a target firm as one piece of evidence 
in a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to predicting whether a postmerger group of firms 
would be able to overcome the difficulties inherent in coordination.”). 
 71. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, § 2. 
 72. Id. § 2.1. 
 73. Id. § 2.1.5; see also Owings, supra note 55, at 343 (stating that there is a list of traits that 
one might find, including: offering consistently low prices, having an innovative offering or 
business model, and having the ability to rapidly expand production). 
 74. See Baker, supra note 58, at 200. 
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III.  THE MAVERICK THEORY SOARS: FROM AFTERTHOUGHT TO DIRECT 
EVIDENCE 
The maverick theory has had an evolving role in antitrust enforcement, 
from an afterthought to direct evidence of anticompetitive mergers. Although 
the maverick theory has appeared in previous guideline versions, in 
contemporary antitrust practice, mavericks are generally identified to 
supplement other evidence of anticompetitive behavior.75 Traditionally, a 
merger review begins with identifying the relevant geographic and product 
markets, which, in the airline context, is defined as the scheduled air transport 
between city pairs.76 In the past, the predominant view among industry experts 
and academia was that when few firms competed in an industry, they would 
easily learn to collaborate, to control the industry, and to raise prices.77 
Moreover, in the past, harm to competition from the loss of a rival was 
presumed without analysis.78 
In prior versions of the guidelines, the maverick status of a target firm was 
considered “one piece of evidence in a totality-of-the-circumstances approach 
to predicting whether a postmerger group of firms would be able to overcome 
the difficulties inherent in coordination.”79 The totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach was consistent with the view that, instead of relying upon formalistic 
evidence, the agencies should examine economic effects of a proposed merger 
on a case-by-case basis.80 The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines reflected 
this focus, stating that the government would “focus first” on examining the 
possible post-merger market, but then take into consideration a variety of other 
factors that would “create, enhance or facilitate the exercise of market 
power.”81 
In recent years, however, case law and economics literature have indicated 
eroding support for the traditional analysis, which assumed that the loss of a 
rival harmed competition.82 Instead, emerging support is directed towards other 
possible ways of identifying an anticompetitive merger.83 The revised 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines reflected this analytical change.84 Rather than 
 
 75. Owings, supra note 55, at 328. 
 76. Martin, supra note 21. The reason that the city pair is used, according to the DOJ, is that 
most passengers’ travel destinations are predetermined, and, thus, passengers would not be 
willing to substitute for a different destination when the ticket price to the desired city was 
increased. Id. 
 77. Baker, supra note 58, at 138. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Owings, supra note 55, at 328. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 330. 
 82. Baker, supra note 58, at 136. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Owings, supra note 55, at 328. 
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placing emphasis on the market shares and market structures, like previous 
versions of the guidelines, the 2010 Merger Guidelines considered the 
existence of a maverick firm to be direct evidence of an anticompetitive 
merger and placed more emphasis on competitive effects.85 The changed 
guidelines moved away from “wooden presumptions against mergers based on 
market share” and moved towards an analysis of post-merger market 
performance.86 While the 2010 edition of the Merger Guidelines does not 
abandon the totality-of-the-circumstances approach,87 there is a distinct move 
away from the traditional approach, as the maverick theory is provided as 
another possible way to identify an anticompetitive merger.88 
IV.  ANTITRUST AND THE MAVERICK THEORY GROUNDED DURING THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 
Antitrust enforcement under President George W. Bush’s administration, 
prior to the 2010 update to the Merger Guidelines, provides a clear example of 
the minimal role that the maverick theory played in the past.89 Under the Bush 
administration, antitrust enforcers either did not utilize or did not rely heavily 
on the maverick theory.90 Moreover, under President Bush, antitrust 
enforcement declined significantly from previous administrations, causing the 
Bush administration to be called “more permissive on antitrust issues than any 
administration in modern times.”91 In fact, the Wall Street Journal opined that 
“[t]he federal government has nearly stepped out of the antitrust enforcement 
business, leaving companies to mate as they wish.”92 
 
 85. Botti & Swisher, supra note 21, at 2. See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, supra note 3, § 2. 
 86. Botti & Swisher, supra note 21, at 2. 
 87. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, § 2 (“The Agencies 
consider any reasonably available and reliable evidence to address the central question of whether 
a merger may substantially lessen competition.”). 
 88. Owings, supra note 55, at 331. 
 89. See Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 
in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 235, 246 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). 
 90. See id. at 244–46. See also Botti & Swisher, supra note 21, at 2; Coordinated Effects 
Analysis: The Arch Coal Decision, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Mar. 2005, at 1, 2–4; Michael P. 
Bodosky, United States v. Arch Coal, Inc.: U.S. District Court Rejects Likelihood of 
Anticompetitive Post-Merger Coordinated Interaction Among Leading U.S. Coal Producers, 
MONDAQ (Mar. 9, 2005), http://www.mondaq.com (enter article title into search bar; then follow 
hyperlink). 
 91. Baker & Shapiro, supra note 89, at 244 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 92. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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A. Maverick Theory Does Not Leave the Runway 
The perception of the Bush administration’s lax merger policy was 
perpetuated by the failure to take any action when Whirlpool sought to acquire 
Maytag in 2006.93 The DOJ investigated the proposed acquisition of Maytag 
and determined that, despite the dominant market share the merged companies 
would have, the deal was not likely to substantially reduce competition among 
home appliance manufacturers.94 However, the merger created a dramatic 
increase in concentration, leaving Whirlpool with more than seventy percent of 
the market share for washers and dryers.95 Additionally, the press reported that 
Maytag was a high-cost producer and that Whirlpool was a more efficient, 
low-cost producer.96 Normally, a lower-cost firm would compete to gain share 
from the higher-cost firm, benefiting consumers and causing the higher-cost 
firm to become more efficient.97 In failing to pursue an antitrust enforcement 
action, the DOJ did not explain why consumers would benefit if the lower-cost 
firm acquired the higher-cost firm.98 Unlike the Obama administration, which 
has been willing to walk fine doctrinal lines to pursue antitrust enforcement 
through theories such as the maverick theory,99 the Bush administration let the 
Maytag/Whirlpool transaction pass.100 One practitioner dubbed the 
Maytag/Whirlpool transaction as a “close deal” that “would have had a hard 
time” getting through under other administrations.101 Had the administration 
pursued a suit against the Maytag/Whirlpool transaction and identified Maytag 
as a maverick that would be compromised in the combination, there may have 
been a totally different outcome.102 
B. The Maverick Theory: Flying but Low on Fuel 
In cases that the Bush administration did challenge, the maverick theory 
appeared103 but not as the foremost theory upon which the case relied.104 For 
 
 93. Id. at 248. 
 94. Diana B. Henriques, U.S. Antitrust Review Backs Whirlpool-Maytag Merger, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at C3. 
 95. Baker & Shapiro, supra note 89, at 248. 
 96. Id. at 249–50. 
 97. Id. at 250. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Botti & Swisher, supra note 21, at 2–3. 
 100. Baker & Shapiro, supra note 89, at 248–50. 
 101. Id. at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 102. See id. at 249. The Bush administration could have challenged this transaction by relying 
on the maverick theory. The maverick theory was applicable since the transaction eliminated the 
higher-cost firm from the market, leaving Whirlpool with seventy percent market share and 
without a significant competitor to incentivize efficiency. See id. 
 103. See Botti & Swisher, supra note 21, at 2. 
 104. See Bodosky, supra note 90. 
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example, in the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Arch Coal, Inc., the 
antitrust enforcement agency sustained a loss after the court found that Triton 
Coal, one of the two merging parties, was not a maverick.105 There are fourteen 
mines in Wyoming’s Southern Powder River Basin (SPRB) region, a region 
known for low sulphur content coal, and seven companies, including Arch 
Coal and Triton Coal, operate the mines.106 Arch Coal proposed to purchase 
the assets of its rival, but the FTC challenged the purchase, seeking a federal 
court order blocking the $364 million deal.107 The FTC claimed that the deal 
would hurt competition because it would leave the top three competitors 
controlling eighty-six percent of the coal production in the SPRB.108 One of the 
theories that the FTC presented was that while other producers exercised 
production discipline to stabilize prices in the SPRB, Triton “rapidly expanded 
production at its North Rochelle mine.”109 The FTC claimed that Arch Coal, in 
acquiring Triton Coal, hoped to eliminate an “undisciplined” producer and 
more forcefully dominate production and demand.110 Despite the FTC’s 
arguments, the trial court found Triton’s North Rochelle mine to be “one of the 
highest cost mines in the SPRB.”111 The court ultimately refused to enjoin the 
transaction, concluding that “the government failed to meet its burden . . . 
because the merger . . . did ‘not reduce the number of competitors and only 
modestly increase[d] the concentration in what has been a very competitive 
market.’”112 
The court, in considering whether Triton’s actions in the SPRB indicated 
that they were a maverick firm, stated that to be a maverick firm in an auction 
market, a firm must “consistently compete aggressively when it bids, causing 
other firms to bid more aggressively when it is present.”113 Moreover, the court 
found that “Triton does not lead or even influence pricing in the market, does 
not compete aggressively, and does not have a history of bidding on contracts 
 
 105. See James F. Rill & Howard Rosenblatt, Coordinated Interaction and Collective 
Dominance: A Remarkable Journey Towards Convergence, in ON THE MERITS: CURRENT ISSUES 
IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 127, 144–45 (Paul Lugard & Leigh Hancher eds., 2005). See 
also Bodosky, supra note 90. 
 106. Rill & Rosenblatt, supra note 105. 
 107. Company News; F.T.C. Plans to Challenge Arch Coal’s Purchase of Rival, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 1, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/01/business/company-news-ftc-plans-to-chal 
lenge-arch-coal-s-purchase-of-rival.html?ref=archcoalinc. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Bodosky, supra note 90. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 112. Rill & Rosenblatt, supra note 105, at 145 (quoting Fed.Trade Comm’n v. Arch Coal, 
Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d. 109, 115 (D.D.C. 2004)). 
 113. Bodosky, supra note 90 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arch Coal, Inc., 329 
F. Supp. 2d at 146). 
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consistent with the behavior of a maverick in the SPRB market.”114 The FTC 
utilized strong customer disapproval of the Arch/Triton combination to support 
its suit, even having some of the customers testify before the court and present 
economic studies in support of their opposition.115 The court, however, 
disagreed with the FTC, rejecting each of the arguments due to inadequacy or 
inconclusiveness.116 As a result of the FTC’s inability to show how the merger 
would make coordination among the remaining firms more likely, the court 
had no legal basis to block the merger, despite the attempt to utilize the 
maverick theory.117 
Thus, as demonstrated, the Bush administration took a much different 
stance on antitrust enforcement, both through the lack of enforcement in cases 
that usually would be opposed118 and the weak use of the maverick theory in 
cases such as Arch Coal.119 
V.  THE MAVERICK THEORY TAKES OFF UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
Since the 2010 revision of the Merger Guidelines, the Obama 
administration’s approach to antitrust enforcement has provided evidence that 
the totality-of-the-circumstances approach is eroding in favor of other ways to 
identify anticompetitive mergers, such as the maverick theory.120 President 
Obama, as was promised in his campaign, has not only taken a more 
aggressive stance in the number of enforcement actions,121 but also in the 
utilization of the maverick theory.122 In recent years, marketplace mavericks 
have commonly appeared in merger enforcement actions.123 Over the past five 
years (FY 2009-2013), the FTC and the DOJ have challenged 107 merger 
transactions.124 Of these 107 merger enforcement actions, a number of cases 
indicated that one of the firms involved in the proposed merger played a 
maverick-type, disruptive role in the industry, including the cases of AT&T/T-
 
 114. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d at 147). 
 115. Coordinated Effects Analysis: The Arch Coal Decision, supra note 90, at 2. 
 116. Id. at 4. 
 117. Id. The court even went so far as to call the FTC’s theory that the merger would facilitate 
output restriction “novel,” indicating the theory was underdeveloped analytically and 
insufficiently supported by the evidence since the theories presented were not novel economics. 
Id. 
 118. See, e.g., Baker & Shapiro, supra note 89, at 250. 
 119. See Coordinated Effects Analysis: The Arch Coal Decision, supra note 90, at 4; 
Bodosky, supra note 90. 
 120. Owings, supra note 55, at 330–31. 
 121. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
 122. See infra notes 124–130 and accompanying text. 
 123. See, e.g., United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 124. Competition Enforcement Database, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/compete 
tion-enforcement-database (last visited Sept. 18, 2014). 
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Mobile,125 Ticketmaster/Live Nation,126 Dean Foods/Foremost Farms,127 
LabCorp/Westcliff,128 H&R Block/TaxACT,129 and ABI/Modelo.130 The case 
of ABI/Modelo is a particularly notable example in that it demonstrates the 
application of the maverick theory to a transaction after the 2010 revision of 
the Merger Guidelines.131 Although the previous administration, under 
President George W. Bush, applied and endorsed the maverick theory,132 the 
ABI/Modelo transaction is the DOJ’s first significant application in a merger 
challenge of the revised Merger Guidelines that emphasize direct evidence of 
competitive effects.133 
Prior to 2012, ABI owned half of Modelo, the producer of Corona beer.134 
In 2012, however, ABI sought to purchase the other half of Modelo, and in 
response, the U.S. government filed a lawsuit seeking to stop the transaction.135 
After a decade of consolidation by brewers around the world, the action by the 
DOJ to stop the ABI/Modelo deal was the “first major roadblock.”136 The 
government’s move caused trepidation regarding the future of one of the 
biggest deals of 2012, signaling a more aggressive approach by antitrust 
officials.137 In justifying their actions, U.S. authorities cited concerns that the 
proposed Modelo merger would give ABI more control of the U.S. beer market 
and the effect on customers would be higher prices and fewer choices.138 At 
that time, Modelo was the third-largest beer company in the United States, 
following ABI as the largest and MillerCoors as the second-largest.139 Modelo 
 
 125. Amended Complaint at 4, United States v. AT&T Inc., No. 11-01560 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f275100/275128.pdf. 
 126. Complaint at 5–6, United States v. Ticketmaster Entm’t, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-00139 
(D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f254500/254552.pdf. 
 127. Complaint at 2, United States v. Dean Foods Co., No. 10-C-0059 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 22, 
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f254400/254455.pdf. 
 128. Complaint at 1–3, Lab. Corp. of Am., No. 9345 (F.T.C. Nov. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/12/101201lapcorpcmpt.pdf. 
 129. Complaint at 2, United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(No. 1:11-CV-00948), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f271500/271579.pdf. 
 130. Complaint at 2–3, United States v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, No. 13-127 (D.D.C. 
Jan. 31, 2013), 2013 WL 362891. 
 131. Botti & Swisher, supra note 21, at 2. 
 132. See supra Part IV.B. 
 133. Botti & Swisher, supra note 21, at 2. 
 134. Mark Scott, Anheuser-Busch InBev Revises $20.1 Billion Takeover Plan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 15, 2013, at B7. See also Diane Bartz & Martinne Geller, U.S. Sues to Stop Beer Deal to 
Unite Bud and Corona, REUTERS (Jan. 31, 2013, 5:38 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/ 
01/31/us-modelo-abi-antitrust-idUSBRE90U0X620130131. 
 135. Bartz & Geller, supra note 134. 
 136. Scott, supra note 134. 
 137. Scott, supra note 134; Bartz & Geller, supra note 134. 
 138. Scott, supra note 134. 
 139. Id. 
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played a significant role in the marketplace by restricting the two market 
leaders from raising their prices despite having only seven percent of the 
national beer market.140 
The underlying theory of the DOJ’s case was that ABI hoped to remove 
Modelo’s “maverick” presence from the marketplace due to Modelo’s 
insubordination in following ABI-led price increases.141 Given their control 
over the marketplace, ABI and MillerCoors could, in theory, raise prices 
without much resistance, but in actuality, when ABI and MillerCoors raised 
their prices, Modelo would keep its prices stable and gain market share, mainly 
due to its popular Corona beer.142 To show that Modelo had undermined ABI’s 
prices, the DOJ utilized documents and communication from within ABI.143 
The government alleged that Modelo resisted ABI-prompted price increases by 
implementing “The Momentum Plan,” helping to close the “price gap” 
between ABI’s cheaper domestic brands, including Bud and Bud Light, and 
Modelo’s brands.144 Because Modelo prices diverged from ABI’s price 
increases, the variance exerted a downward pressure on the price of beer,145 
forcing ABI and MillerCoors to discourage their customers from “trad[ing] up” 
with price cuts and promotional markdowns.146 The DOJ alleged that “[i]f ABI 
were to acquire . . . Modelo, this competitive constraint on ABI’s and 
MillerCoors’ ability to raise their prices would be eliminated.”147 
Furthermore, ABI’s internal communications confirmed the DOJ’s 
allegation regarding the pressure ABI experienced from Modelo’s competitive 
prices, as ABI protested the results.148 In the internal documents, ABI stated: 
“Recent price actions delivered expected Trade up from Sub-Premium, 
however it created additional share pressure from volume shifting to High End 
where we under-index;” “Consumers switching to High End accelerated by 
price gap compression;” “While relative Price to MC [MillerCoors] has 
remained stable the lack of Price increase in Corona is increasing pressure in 
Premium.”149 
 
 140. Deborah L. Feinstein, New Leadership at the Federal Antitrust Agencies: Change 
Matters, ANTITRUST, Spring 2013, at 6, 7. ABI did take some actions to restrict the effect of the 
transaction on Modelo brand prices, and many believed that more actions could be taken to assure 
that there would be no anticompetitive effect. Id. 
 141. Botti & Swisher, supra note 21, at 2. 
 142. Bartz & Geller, supra note 134. 
 143. Scott, supra note 134. 
 144. Complaint, supra note 130, at 3. 
 145. Botti & Swisher, supra note 21, at 2. 
 146. Complaint, supra note 130, at 3. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 15. 
 149. Id. 
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In fact, in California, Modelo caused a price war due to ABI’s anxiety over 
losing market share.150 There, “ABI implemented ‘aggressive price 
reductions . . . ‘ that were seen as ‘specifically targeting Corona and 
Modelo.’”151 According to the DOJ, “[t]hese aggressive discounts appear[ed] 
to have been taken in support of ABI’s expressed desire to discipline Modelo’s 
aggressive pricing with the ultimate goal of ‘driv[ing] them to go up’ in 
price.”152 In response, both MillerCoors and Modelo dropped their prices, and 
ABI reciprocated with an additional price decrease.153 Similar battles occurred 
from 2010 to 2012 in Texas and New York City, where Modelo kept ABI from 
raising prices, forced it to lower prices, or caused it to lose market share.154 
In essence, the DOJ used a traditional “coordinated effects” theory, 
claiming that Modelo operated as a maverick and would be eliminated if the 
merger succeeded.155 Although the DOJ’s theory was not groundbreaking in 
light of the Bush administration’s use of the maverick theory, the DOJ’s 
manner of applying the maverick theory is notable given the changed Merger 
Guidelines.156 As previously noted, the revised Merger Guidelines focus less 
on market shares and market structures and more on direct evidence of the 
post-merger effects on competition.157 The ABI/Modelo action exemplifies this 
analytical change, given that Modelo was only one of a number of other 
competitors, including at least one global brewer, had only a seven percent 
market share,158 and was roughly fifty percent owned by ABI159—not the type 
of market participant that is likely to impact the actions of the market leaders 
like ABI and MillerCoors.160 Instead of only examining these structural facts, 
the DOJ focused on the effect that eliminating Modelo would have on 
competition in the industry,161 such as eliminating ABI’s need to discourage 
consumers from trading up through decreased prices.162 The DOJ stated that 
the parties’ “combined national share actually understates the effect that 
eliminating Modelo would have on competition in the beer industry.”163 Thus, 
because Modelo’s small share would generally be viewed as a real, economic 
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 151. Complaint, supra note 130, at 16. 
 152. Id. 
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indicator weakening or calling into question the potential anticompetitive 
effect, the DOJ walked a “fine doctrinal line” in opposing the transaction, 
relying heavily upon the maverick theory to do so.164 
Moreover, rather than utilizing the judicial system to settle the fight, ABI 
and the DOJ settled the case.165 In doing so, ABI chose to divest certain brands 
and agree to other remedies to appease the DOJ’s concerns.166 One of the 
changes to the restructured transaction required ABI to offer Constellation, a 
distributor of Modelo products, a brewery and a perpetual license.167 
Additionally, under the settlement, ABI was required to sell its domestic rights 
to certain Modelo brands including Corona, which eventually sold for $2.9 
billion to Constellation Brands.168 In deciding to sell rights to Corona, Corona 
Light, and Modelo Especial, ABI made an effort to satisfy the DOJ’s concerns 
about the anticompetitive effect of the original takeover.169 As of June 4, 2013, 
ABI had wrapped up its transaction with Modelo.170 
In some ways, the remedy that the DOJ secured in this case seems to be a 
traditional merger remedy calling for divestiture of assets in the relevant 
market, but the DOJ explained the remedy as a “clean, structural remedy that 
eliminate[d] the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition.”171 In fact, Assistant 
Attorney General Bill Baer stated, “This is a win for the $80 billion U.S. beer 
market and consumers. If this settlement makes just a one percent difference in 
prices, U.S. consumers will save almost $1 billion a year.”172 Therefore, 
despite structural facts cutting against the challenge, such as Modelo being 
only one of a number of competitors and having only seven percent market 
share, the DOJ’s willingness to bring this case exemplifies the Obama 
administration’s aggressive merger enforcement through the use of the 
maverick theory.173 Subsequently, while still wielding the sword of the 
maverick theory, the Obama administration chose to fight another antitrust 
battle, the American Airlines/US Airways merger transaction.174 
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VI.  TURBULENCE FOR AMERICAN AIRLINES/US AIRWAYS MERGER 
TRANSACTION 
Unlike previous mergers in the airline industry, American Airlines/US 
Airways faced the DOJ’s aggressive opposition using the revised Merger 
Guidelines and the maverick theory.175 In 2005, there were nine major airlines 
flying inside the United States, and as of 2013, there were only five.176 
Antitrust regulators commented that instead of strengthening the case for the 
American Airlines/US Airways transaction, the many previous airline mergers 
had actually weakened its chances of approval.177 Though the previous mergers 
had some positive effect, such as restoring profits and stability in the airline 
industry, they also had a negative effect, namely higher fares.178 Additionally, 
the airline mergers often did not provide the services they promised, but 
instead used the market to raise fares and fees.179 In fact, prices for some big-
city routes increased forty to fifty percent or more after mergers reduced 
competition.180 For example, between Houston and Chicago, the average fare 
in the third quarter was fifty-seven percent higher than the same period three 
years earlier, before United Airlines and Continental Airlines merged.181 
The recent merger between American Airlines and US Airways brings the 
total major airlines flying domestically down to four and creates the largest 
airline worldwide.182 In fact, the originally proposed American Airlines/US 
Airways deal would have allowed four airlines to control more than eighty 
percent of the U.S. market.183 So, how is the present merger different than the 
many previous airline combinations that the DOJ allowed? One possible 
explanation, which the DOJ relied upon, is the existence of a maverick firm 
among the merging parties.184 In the suit, the DOJ focused on US Airways’ 
position in the marketplace.185 US Airways was a much smaller airline than 
American, and it offered inexpensive, one-stop fares called “Advantage 
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Fares.”186 According to the complaint, the Advantage Fares strategy undercut 
the prices of American, Delta, and United Airlines and “forced the other three 
airlines to drop prices more than they normally would.”187 Thus, the DOJ 
alleged that US Airways operated as a maverick firm in the marketplace, 
disrupting the industry with their “Advantage Fares.”188 If all else were equal, 
most passengers would prefer a nonstop flight over a one-stop flight, and so 
the significant discounts that US Airways offered on its one-stop flights 
captured a meaningful portion of the market on those routes.189 
The novelty in US Airways’ position is evident in the relationship that 
airlines have with their rival firms.190 In the airline industry, there is an 
unwritten “respect” for competitors, whereby firms avoid subverting their 
competition’s nonstop flights with less expensive one-stop flights.191 One 
possible explanation for this so-called “respect” is that the “respect” would be 
more accurately classified as “fear.”192 Indeed, the concern for the undercutting 
airline is a fear of retaliation: “if I undercut my rival on routes where it offers 
nonstop service, the rival will undercut me on routes where I offer a nonstop 
service.”193 Therefore, the DOJ was concerned that without US Airways’ 
presence in the market offering discounted airfares, it would be easier for 
Delta, United, and American, the three other major domestic airlines, to 
overcharge consumers.194 The DOJ expected increased prices mainly in 
markets that American and US Airways control, such as Washington 
National.195 The DOJ alleged that if US Airways and American merged, the 
new American Airlines “would likely abandon Advantage Fares, ending 
significant competition and causing consumers to pay hundreds of millions of 
dollars more.”196 
Moreover, the DOJ began settlement talks with the airlines, negotiating to 
drop the merger challenge if American and US Airways would divest some 
takeoff and landing slots.197 These negotiations began three weeks before trial 
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on the suit was scheduled to start in federal court in the District of Columbia 
and included a request for “divestitures of facilities at key constrained airports 
throughout the United States.”198 For example, at Reagan National Airport, 
near Washington, D.C., the two airlines control about two-thirds of the landing 
and takeoff slots; thus, the department requested that US Airways and 
American Airlines sell an unspecified number of slots.199 Although hoping for 
settlement, the DOJ remained committed to resolving its concerns, stating, 
“We will not agree to something that does not fundamentally resolve the 
concerns that were expressed in the complaint.”200 
Despite earlier claims that the airline merger would lead to price increases 
and cost consumers millions, DOJ settled the suit, dropping its opposition to 
the American/US Airways merger.201 The settlement, which required the 
merged airline to give up space at Reagan National Airport, sought to increase 
competition and decrease fare prices for flights to hub-cities.202 One major 
problem with the merger in its original form was the control that the new 
airline would have had over National—sixty-nine percent of all flights—but in 
its amended form, the new airline, still known as American Airlines, will lose 
forty-four flights from National airport.203 The agreement will open the door at 
National for low-cost carriers (LCCs) such as Southwest, JetBlue, and Virgin 
American.204 Additionally, the settlement required the new American to 
relinquish spots at Boston Logan International, Chicago O’Hare International, 
Dallas Love Field, Los Angeles International, Miami International, and New 
York LaGuardia.205 LCCs who acquire the relinquished slots and gates will be 
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able to increase competition.206 In fact, Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer 
stated: 
The extensive slot and gate divestitures at these key airports are 
groundbreaking and they will dramatically enhance the ability of LCCs to 
compete system-wide. . . . This settlement will disrupt the cozy relationships 
among the incumbent legacy carriers, increase access to key congested airports 
and provide consumers with more choices and more competitive airfares on 
flights all across the country.207 
Thus, even in settling the case outside the judicial system, the DOJ achieved its 
goal of ensuring consumer protection and maintaining competitive markets208 
by opening once dominated airports to LCCs.209 
However, the settlement would not be effective if other large airlines were 
allowed to bid on the opened slots and gates. If large competitors such as Delta 
and United Airlines were not barred from bidding on these slots, the settlement 
would only maintain the status quo and would fail to address the loss of 
competition from the American Airlines/US Airways merger.210 Delta had 
expressed interest in bidding on slots, particularly at Dallas Love Field and 
Reagan National, but the DOJ found Delta ineligible for the slots at Love 
Field.211 Originally, it was unclear whether Delta would ultimately win any slot 
given the DOJ’s inclination toward budget carriers.212 The divestiture process 
of the 104 Reagan National slots resulted in Southwest Airlines acquiring fifty-
four slots, JetBlue picking up forty slots, and Virgin American buying eight, 
while two weekend slots remained unclaimed.213 At LaGuardia, American 
divested thirty-four slots, with twenty-two going to Southwest and twelve 
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going to Virgin America.214 Moreover, it remains to be seen whether this 
opportunity will actually result in expanded presence for LCCs, but the 
opportunity has at least been presented. Regardless, thanks to the maverick 
theory, the DOJ levied a valid challenge to the American Airlines/US Airways 
merger, leaving the companies with little choice but to make concessions and 
appease the DOJ. 
VII.  FUTURE FOR MERGERS: EXPECT A BUMPY RIDE 
The outcome in the American Airlines/US Airways merger should be 
examined in the context of recently emerging trends in merger enforcement. 
This case is much like the ABI/Modelo transaction, which provided insight 
into the current administration’s aggressive enforcement as well as the effect of 
the changed weight of identifying a maverick firm amongst the merging 
parties.215 In the ABI/Modelo transaction, the DOJ departed from traditional 
analysis, which applied great weight to structural facts such as market share in 
a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.216 Instead, the DOJ relied upon the 
identification of Modelo as maverick firm to predict the effect that eliminating 
Modelo would have on competition in the industry,217 despite Modelo only 
capturing about seven percent of the national beer market.218 Likewise, here, in 
the case of the new American Airlines, US Airways was a much smaller airline 
than American, with about 48.06 billion domestic revenue passenger miles 
from August 2012 to July 2013.219 Contrastingly, during that same period, 
Delta, the largest airline, had about 93.3 billion, United had 89.97 billion, 
Southwest had 88.11 billion, and American had 73.18 billion.220 US Airways’ 
comparatively smaller size is a fact that would generally cut against the DOJ’s 
argument that the merger is anticompetitive.221 However, given that US 
Airways provided “Advantage Fares,” the DOJ asserted that it operated as a 
maverick in the marketplace in “forc[ing] the other three airlines to drop prices 
more than they normally would.”222 Since the 2010 revisions of the Merger 
Guidelines placed greater weight on the identification of a maverick as direct 
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evidence,223 the DOJ’s suit focused less on structural concerns, which were 
still present, and more on the likelihood of anticompetitive behavior post-
merger, utilizing the maverick theory in order to walk a “fine doctrinal line” 
and ease its concerns.224 
Furthermore, the two cases are similar in their outcome: both settling 
outside of the judicial system and avoiding an extended court battle, yet also 
addressing the DOJ’s concerns before agreeing to the transaction.225 In 
ABI/Modelo, the DOJ settled with ABI, allowing the transaction to 
consummate but not without addressing its concerns by forcing ABI to both 
divest certain brands and offer a brewery and perpetual license to a 
distributor.226 Similarly, in the American Airlines transaction, despite settling 
outside the judicial system, the decision to settle did in fact address the DOJ’s 
concerns.227 The agreement to allow the merger to proceed forced the two 
carriers to give up landing and takeoff slots as well as gates at key airports, 
which the government hopes will “increase access to the nation’s busiest 
airports for low-cost airlines and . . . maintain flights to smaller cities.”228 For 
example, small airlines, such as Allegiant and Frontier airlines, have 
previously focused on serving smaller cities that have trouble attracting larger 
airlines, but open slots in New York and Washington allowed them the 
opportunity to bid on the openings.229 Additionally, Virgin America has 
struggled with heavy debt and losses, but this merger might allow them to seek 
the open slots in order to take advantage of those markets.230 The 104 slots in 
D.C. and thirty-four slots at LaGuardia International in New York will, 
hopefully, help in the long run to turn the mid-size players into genuine 
competitors.231 
Moreover, deciding to settle outside the judicial system may seemingly 
indicate less aggressive merger enforcement; however, the DOJ walked a fine 
doctrinal line in order to address its concerns. Under other administrations, 
cases such as ABI/Modelo and American Airlines/US Airways may not have 
even been challenged due to structural facts, such as the market structure and 
market share, cutting against the challenge.232 Contrastingly, given the Obama 
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administration’s aggressive enforcement, the DOJ chose to challenge both 
cases and procured concessions in both.233 In both cases, the settlements 
indicate that there may be shades of aggressive enforcement, whereby the 
antitrust enforcers can achieve their goals without permanently blocking the 
merger. The shades of aggressive enforcement seem especially vivid in cases 
blotched with structural facts cutting against the challenge.234 Two clear 
examples of such cases are the ABI/Modelo and American Airlines/US 
Airways merger transactions, where the DOJ began by challenging the 
transactions but ended with a settlement addressing its concerns.235 A question 
that may arise is whether there is anything about these two particular 
industries, outside of the individual mergers, that caused the Obama 
administration to choose to challenge the transactions in the first place but then 
settle the cases. Perhaps there is a necessary appearance of regulation for the 
industries based upon the political party associated with the challenge. 
However, these questions are outside the scope of this Comment. 
In the future, the potential for administrations to use the maverick theory 
unpredictably could create uncertainty for businesses. Throughout the rest of 
Obama’s second term, the DOJ could continue to use the maverick theory to 
aggressively enforce antitrust laws, given the changed Merger Guidelines and 
the DOJ’s recent strong use of the maverick theory.236 However, the question 
arises as to how subsequent administrations will utilize the maverick theory in 
the future.237 Since the maverick theory can operate as both a sword and a 
shield, the maverick theory could be utilized in a way that will most effectively 
achieve the goals of the administration in control.238 For example, if President 
Obama’s successor is more similar in views to the Bush administration, the 
maverick theory is less likely to be utilized, raised only as a shield of 
protection. When it is utilized, it may be on the back-burner, as it was in 
traditional merger analyses.239 On the other hand, if the next administration is 
more similar to President Obama’s administration, a likely outcome given 
recent political trends,240 the maverick theory could be a “frequent-flyer,” so to 
speak, of antitrust enforcement.241 Furthermore, continued divergence from 
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traditional analyses is foreseeable, with a greater focus on post-merger 
marketplace than things such as concentration and market share.242 Moreover, 
while parties on both sides of the political spectrum may not utilize the 
maverick theory consistently, it is clear that the maverick theory will play a 
key role in antitrust enforcement, either through dormancy or activity. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the DOJ’s decision to challenge the American Airlines/US 
Airways merger serves as further evidence of the Obama administration’s 
aggressive enforcement of antitrust policies in that it challenged the merger 
despite the history of allowing airlines to merge and the smaller size of US 
Airways. Such aggressive enforcement and use of the maverick theory was not 
surprising given the change in the Merger Guidelines. In 2010, the changed 
Merger Guidelines delineated the maverick theory as direct evidence of 
anticompetitive behavior. Thus, like in the ABI/Modelo transaction, the DOJ’s 
utilization of the maverick theory in its complaint in the American Airlines/US 
Airways merger permitted it to challenge the merger as well as ease concerns 
of anticompetitive behavior. After comparing the use of the maverick theory 
under the Bush administration and under the Obama administration, there is a 
clear dichotomy between the two administrations, and it is evident that the 
maverick theory can be a viable weapon in challenging mergers depending on 
the way it is utilized. Moreover, due to the unpredictable use of the maverick 
theory in antitrust enforcement, those pursuing mergers in the future should 
expect the unexpected. If there is something specific about the beer and airline 
industries that influenced the DOJ’s action in the ABI/Modelo and American 
Airlines/US Airways transactions, the future seems especially bumpy for 
mergers in those industries as well as industries similar in structure. Overall, in 
the future, prudent businesses will learn to examine the administration, 
comparing its antitrust policies to the Bush and Obama administrations in order 
to predict the strength of antitrust enforcement that the administration will 
pursue and the utilization of the maverick theory. 
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